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‘The Union’s external policy is not easy to define. It goes beyond the traditional 
diplomatic and military aspects and stretches to areas such as justice and police 
matters, the environment, trade and customs affairs, development and external 
representation of the euro zone. Our aim must be to integrate these different 
areas and make all the resources available work together well.’  
- European Commission, A Project for the European Union, 22 May 20021 
 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
As recently as a few years ago, it could be shown that regarding the existence and 
nature of a legal system of the European Union there was no clear legal picture at 
all and certainly no consensus of opinion. To this very day, one can observe the 
existence of largely isolated EC, CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) 
and PJCC (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) research 
communities, in which research is frequently ‘content driven’ rather than reflect-
ing a more institutional approach.2 Over the past years, a separate school of 
thought has laid emphasis on the unity of the Union’s legal order rather than on 
the differences between the Union’s three pillars. One research group in this 
school, in which the present author participated, concentrated on two main 
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1 Communication from the Commission, A Project for the European Union, COM (2002) 247 
final, 22 May 2002, p. 12. The remaining part of the paragraph is also relevant: ‘It is not a question 
of the “communitarisation” of foreign policy, applying the traditional Community procedures, as this 
would not be compatible with the emergence of a European military dimension, but nor should we 
make external policy more “intergovernmental” by extending the powers of the Member States or of 
the High Representative to the detriment of the Commission. Wholesale “communitarisation” would 
not today make it possible to embrace the full political dimension of external policy, which is not a 
mere set of powers, instruments and areas of action; nor would it be able to cater fully for the 
military aspects.’  
 
The European Union: An Ongoing Process of Integration – Liber Amicorum Alfred E. Kellermann 
© 2004, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The Hague, and the authors 
2  For a general survey of the CFSP and PJCC, see E. Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of 
the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002). 
RAMSES A. WESSEL 124 
questions: whether the European Union could be qualified as an international 
organisation in legal terms, and, if so, whether its institutional legal system is 
developing in practice towards institutional unity, albeit in disguise. We analysed 
the Union as a legal institution and defended the thesis that the Union is an 
international organisation with a unitary but complex character. This conclusion 
was not only based on the analysis of the Union Treaties and other basic instru-
ments, but also on so-called legal practices, i.e. forms of legal action that are – 
explicitly or implicitly – employed in order to make the legal institution an 
operational entity.3 
With regard to the European Union as a whole, one can thus perceive a clear 
evolution towards more institutional unity across the spectrum of the European 
Union, which has taken place incrementally over the course of the past ten years. 
This evolution tends to manifest itself first in so-called legal and institutional 
practices of the institutions themselves and only later, when the manner of 
governance is more established, also in the normative provisions of the European 
Union (treaties and formal laws). Despite the fact that clear elements of such 
progress towards institutional unity are present, this evolution exists in unresolved 
tension with the fact that governance by the European Union is still characterised 
by (considerable) fragmentation in practice. Or, as one observer holds: 
 
‘[What] remains is a fragmented and divided structure, which fails to establish in the 
area of external powers, as for the internal, an organic and comprehensive framework 
and a clear allocation of competences between the Union and its Member States.’4 
 
This has become apparent in the area of the external relations in particular. The 
provision in Article 2 EU that the Union is ‘to assert its identity on the interna-
tional scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and 
security policy’ (emphasis added), leaves open the possibility of the Union acting 
outside the CFSP framework in its external relations. The objectives of the other 
                                                                                                                                               
3  D.M. Curtin and I.F. Dekker, ‘The EU as a “Layered” International Organisation: Institutional 
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University Press 1999) pp. 83-136. See further, D.M. Curtin and I.F. Dekker, ‘The Constitutional 
Structure of the European Union: Some Reflections on Vertical Unity-In-Diversity’, in N. Walker, et 
al., eds., Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Oxford, Hart 2002) pp. 59-78; R.A. 
Wessel, ‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’, European Foreign Affairs Review 
(2000) pp. 507-537; I.F. Dekker and R.A. Wessel, ‘The European Union and the Concept of 
Flexibility. Proliferation of Legal Systems within International Organisations’, in N.M. Blokker and 
H.G. Schermers, eds., Proliferation of International Organisations (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International 2001) pp. 381-414; and R.A. Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999). 
 
4  Cf. A. Tizzano, ‘The Foreign Relations Law of the EU’, in E. Cannizzaro, The European 
Union as an Actor in International Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2002) pp. 135-
147 at p. 137. 
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two parts of the Union indeed imply a role for the Union regarding the external 
dimension of those issue areas as well, and it has proven to be far too simplistic to 
distinguish between a European Community in charge of external commercial 
policy, a CFSP dealing with foreign policy and an isolated PJCC policy for police 
and judicial matters. The overlapping of certain objectives has been unavoidable 
from the outset, as practice has refused to be forced into the straitjacket of treaty 
provisions. Third States and international organisations increasingly approach the 
Union as such, which has resulted in a practice in which the different modes of 
governance no longer coincide with the three original pillars. The fact that 
autonomous legal entities within the Union may have set their own external 
relations regime (as is the case, for example, with regard to Europol) adds 
immensely to this (institutional and substantive) complexity. 
The ambition of this paper is to map the terrain of EU governance in the area of 
external relations by using the previously developed insights from what has been 
termed the legal institutional perspective. Moreover, the term governance is 
deliberately used – instead of other terms more familiar to legal researchers – in 
order to be able to approach the question in a more flexible manner, taking account 
of the informal context as well as the legal and institutional practice and, moreover, 
in order to be able to make a link with more normative issues. While the Commu-
nity method will be used as an implicit benchmark, the focus will be more or less 
exclusively on the second pillar. The modes of governance in this area seem to have 
evolved in an ad hoc manner, almost from Presidency to Presidency. At the same 
time, there has been a certain vulnerability to external influences from other 
international organisations (e.g. NATO in the second pillar) to third States (e.g. the 
United States with regard to the fight against terrorism and other issues) that 
sometimes drive the content. I would like to outline the different institutional 
factors that may be at the origins of the different ways the external relations of the 
European Union as such have evolved. Moreover, I will examine and put into 
context the evidence that the European Union is progressing towards (much) more 
institutional unity as a result of the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe 
(and the subsequent IGC) and consider the possible solutions of the new Constitu-
tion for Europe with regard to the fragmentation of the Union’s external relations. 
 
 
2. THE DIFFICULT SEPARATION BETWEEN EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS ISSUES: A TALE OF THREE PILLARS 
 
Practice has not followed the neat separating lines foreseen in the Union Treaty 
between economics and politics. The international agenda – which includes issues 
such as environmental protection, social standards, development cooperation, 
international security, conflict management, sanctions policy and human rights 
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protection – simply does not take the sensitivities of all Member States into 
account. Political choices are often clearly visible when, for instance, economic 
policies in the field of development cooperation are made public (often with 
explicit objectives concerning democracy, the rule of law and human rights). At 
the same time, economic issues can hardly be approached without political 
choices (e.g. trade conflicts concerning bananas, beef hormones and more 
recently steel), while occasionally the link between politics and economics is 
made explicit (through ‘human rights’ or ‘essential element’ clauses in agree-
ments with third States). Hence, it has been rightly observed that ‘a considerable 
part of “foreign policy” actually belongs to the EC’s day to day business’ and ‘the 
attempt to uphold clear dividing lines between economic and political issues is 
thus artificial and indefensible in practice.’5 
Indeed, overlapping competences can easily be found in the relationship be-
tween the Community and the CFSP. Apart form the fact that the CFSP is to 
cover ‘all areas of foreign and security policy’ (Art. 11 EU), other objectives may 
also raise questions regarding the division of competences. With regard to all 
CFSP objectives, one could argue that the policies in those areas are at the same 
time part of the day-to-day practice of the European Union on the basis of the 
Community Treaty.6 Keeping in mind the ERTA doctrine (internal competences 
result in external ones), the complexity is being increased because of the fact that 
CFSP competences may not only conflict with explicit external Community 
competences, but also with implicit ones.7 This means that it has become increas-
ingly difficult to fix the division of competences between the pillars in a 
Kompetenz Katalog and that it is better to opt for constant mutual tuning.8 A 
practical solution was found in references to instruments that were adopted under 
another pillar regime, but there are examples of CFSP decisions that already 
regulate what is expected of the Community in a certain case.9 
                                                                                                                                               
5  S. Griller and B. Weidel, ‘External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the EU’, in S. 
Griller and B. Weidel, eds., External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union 
(Vienna/New York, Springer 2002) pp. 5-22 at p. 12. 
6  The CFSP objectives in Article 11 EU include the safeguarding of common values, fundamental 
interests and integrity of the Union; the strengthening of the security of the Union; the preservation of 
peace; the promotion of international cooperation and the development and consolidation of democracy 
and the rule of law; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
7  Cf. A. Dashwood, ‘The Attribution of External Relations Competence’, in A. Dashwood and 
C. Hillion, eds., The General Law of EC External Relations (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2000) pp. 
115-138 at p. 116 
8  Cf. one of the very first studies in this area: M. Cremona, ‘The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union and the External Relations Powers of the European Community’, in D. 
O’Keeffe and P.M. Twomey, eds., Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (London, Wiley Chancery 
Law 1994) pp. 247-258 at p. 249. 
 
9  See more extensively B. Weidel, ‘The Impact of the Pillar Construction on External Policy’, in 
Griller and Weidel, op. cit. n. 5, at 23-64 at p. 50; and R.A. Wessel, ‘The Inside Looking Out: 
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The difficult separation can also be seen in the relationship between EC and 
EU cooperation in the area of police and justice. Enhanced cooperation in this 
field may be based on both Article 29 EU and Article 135 EC. Also, in the area of 
data protection, measures relating to the collection, storage, processing and 
exchange of information (Art. 30 EU) may already be covered by Community 
instruments concerning data protection on the basis of Article 95 EC.10 In 
addition, the combating of fraud allows for a choice between Article 280 EC or a 
measure on the basis of PJCC, in which the prevention of fraud forms part of the 
general objectives.11 
An example of ‘pillar-overarching’ decisions may be the Common Strategies, 
which according to Article 13 EU are meant to deal with areas in which the 
Member States have important interests in common.12 So far, Common Strategies 
have been adopted by the European Council on the Russian Federation, Ukraine 
and the Mediterranean.13 Despite their basis in the second pillar, these Common 
Strategies address issues covering the entire Union. More generally, however, the 
intensification of the Union’s external relations has lead to a need to take decisions 
whose scope supersedes mere economic or political foreign policy. The internal 
diversification of competences has thus resulted in a complex picture whenever the 
Union engages in relations with third States or other international organisations. 
The fragmentation of the mechanisms that govern the exercise of external 
powers is visible in relation to a number of areas: 
1. First of all, the external representation of the Union, including its participa-
tion in international organisations, differs between the Community and the other 
two pillars. In the European Community, the Commission is the most important 
actor, both in terms of representation and in relation to the negotiation of interna-
tional agreements (Art. 300 EC). In the area of the CFSP and PJCC, the 
Presidency and the High Representative take a lead in representing the Union. 
Agreements are negotiated by the Presidency (Arts. 24 and 38 EU). The complex 
external representation of the Union may have consequences for its responsibility 
under international law as well.14 
                                                                                                                                               
Consistency and Delimitation in EU External Relations’, CMLRev. (2000) pp. 1135-1171 at pp. 
1152-1157. 
10  E.g. Directive 95/46/EC, OJ 1995 L 281/31, 23 November 1995. 
11  Cf. Weidel, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 27. 
12  See C. Hillion, ‘Common Strategies and the Interface between EC External Relations and the 
CFSP: Lessons of the Partnership between the EU and Russia’, in Dashwood and Hillion, op. cit. n. 
7, at pp. 287-301. 
13  Respectively, Decision 1999/414/CFSP, OJ 1999 L 157, 24 June 1999; Decision 
1999/877/CFSP, OJ 1999 L 331, 23 December 1999; and Decision 2000/458/CFSP, OJ 2000 L 183, 
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14  On this subject, see C. Tomuschat, ‘The International Responsibility of the European Union’, 
in Cannizzaro, op. cit. n. 4, at pp. 177-191. 
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2. Decision-making procedures differ substantially, both with regard to voting 
modalities (qualified majority voting being the default situation in Community 
matters) and the role of the institutions. While the initiating role in the Commu-
nity is obviously in the hands of the Commission, the other two regimes are still 
primarily dependent on initiatives by Member States (in practice often the 
Presidency) and the special preparatory organs of the Council (such as the 
Political and Security Committee). In addition, it is well known that the substan-
tial enlargement of the competences the European Parliament enjoys under the 
Community Treaty have not been followed by a similar boost of powers in the 
other two pillars. 
3. Limited parliamentary control may to some extent be compensated by judi-
cial control. With respect to the CFSP, however, the powers of the Court of 
Justice are excluded by Article 46 EU.15 Within the third pillar, the Court’s 
jurisdiction now includes the new preliminary procedure in Article 35 EU. This 
leads us to conclude that the Court of Justice is left with a limited set of possibili-
ties in the non-Community pillars of the Union. First of all, the Court is allowed 
to review the required compatibility of CFSP and PJCC measures of the Council 
with Community law, including the choice of legal basis and the consistency of 
foreign policy measures (‘policing the boundaries’). This includes the Court’s use 
of the non-judiciable CFSP provisions as aids to interpretation.16 Secondly, it 
seems clear that the Court has jurisdiction whenever the Council makes use of 
‘hybrid’ acts, covering both matters governed by the CFSP or PJCC as well as 
matters governed by the Community Treaties. Examples may be found in the area 
of economic sanctions, development policy, trade policy, anti-terrorism measures 
or measures related to visa and immigration policy. 
4. The available legal instruments differ in all three pillars. This means that in 
the case of cross-pillar issues, addressees may be confronted with a bundle of 
decisions that are not always consistent and differ, at least, in their consequences 
with regard to their legal effects and the possibilities for legal protection. 
Nevertheless, EU law generally forces decision-makers to choose a legal basis 
in one of the pillars. In short, this choice then not only defines the role of the 
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institutions (e.g. whether or not there is room for a Commission initiative or co-
decision by the European Parliament), but also the road to be followed during the 
decision-making process (e.g. whether or not there is a role for the Political and 
Security Committee or other committees), the voting modalities, the type of 
available instrument, the possibilities for judicial protection and the effect of the 
measure in the national legal orders. The connected parts of the external policy of 
the Union may thus result in a varied governance palette.  
The treaty-makers were aware of this problem and included a number of prin-
ciples in the Union Treaty on the basis of which cross-pillar problems are to be 
solved. Here, consistency and the preservation of the acquis communautaire take 
a lead (Art. 3 EU),17 while the latter often hinders the former, but also seems to 
take preference over it. After all, Article 1 EC refers to the Community as the 
foundation of the European Union, supplemented by the policies and forms of 
cooperation in the other two areas. Moreover, the acquis communautaire is not 
only to be preserved, but also to be developed. Thus, the CFSP and PJCC appear 
to be at the service of the development of the Community, as conflicts are to be 
solved to the benefit of the latter, as implied by Article 47 EU (nothing in the 
Union Treaty shall affect the Community Treaties). It was clear from the outset 
that implicit modifications of the Community Treaty are allowed, in the sense that 
Community law is not completely immune to influences from the other two 
pillars.18 The principle of consistency (Art. 3 EU) may serve as a good example in 
this respect, but one may also point to the single institutional structure (Arts. 3 
and 6 EU), the common objectives (Art. 2 EU) or the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Article 6 EU. 
For these provisions to have any effect at all, they will also have to be recognised 
by the Community (which indeed happens in practice).19 While the preservation 
of the acquis communautaire thus seems to form the starting point in cases of 
conflict with the second or third pillar, the functioning of the Community in 
splendid isolation form these pillars is obviously not in conformity with the unity 
of the Union’s legal order as introduced by the Maastricht Treaty.20 
This is not to conceal the fact that even within the first pillar we are familiar 
with fragmented modes of governance. Regarding its external relations, in 
particular, the Community has not assumed an exclusive competence. Even in 
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Union’, 1 European Law Journal (January 2004) pp. 23-41. 
18  See also M. Pechstein, ‘Das Kohärenzgebot als entscheidende Integrationsdimension der 
Europäischen Union’, EuR (1995) pp. 247-258 at p. 252. 
19  See more extensively Wessel, loc. cit. n. 9. 
20  On this unity, see both publications by Curtin and Dekker cited in n. 3 supra. 
 
RAMSES A. WESSEL 130 
such a key area as the Common Commercial Policy, Member States still have a 
role to play in agreements on trade in services and trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property. The same holds true for many other areas, including the 
environment or development cooperation. So, even within the Community we 
come across a mix of exclusive, mixed or even explicitly denied (for instance, 
regarding defence issues) competences of the Community. As some observers 
have noted: ‘Though not explicitly foreseen by the Community Treaty, “mixity” 
has thus become a characteristic feature of European foreign policy.’21 At the 
same time, however, the exclusivity of Community competences does form a 
criterion to judge Member States’ actions in the other two pillars as well. As the 
Court held in ERTA, in the case of exclusive Community powers, all concurrent 
powers of the Member States are barred both ‘in the Community sphere and in 
the international sphere’, and Member States ‘do longer have the right, acting 
individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries 
which affect those [Community] rules.’22 More recently, in Centro-Com, the 
Court added that where a measure would affect Community competence, Member 
States are precluded from action on their own, regardless of the possible foreign 
policy motives of such measures.23 Thus, we have entered the complexity of the 
European Union’s external relations, in which the fragmentation may not only be 
explained on the basis of the pillar structure (horizontal delimitation), but also on 
the basis of the relationship of the Union with its Member States (vertical 
delimitation).24 This is one of the constitutional challenges the Union is facing 
today. 
 
 
3. THE CFSP AND THE OTHER PILLARS: AN INTEGRATED 
APPROACH IN EXTERNAL POLICIES? 
 
In some areas, the Treaties provide solutions for the fact that external policies 
may have a political as well as an economic or justice and home affairs dimen-
sion; in other areas practical solutions have been found. Based on the practice 
within the European Community, the most obvious solution is the use of a dual 
legal basis, but this is only possible when the decision-making procedures 
                                                                                                                                               
21  I. Pernice and D. Thym, ‘A New Institutional Balance for European Foreign Policy?’, Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review (2002) pp. 369-400 at p. 372. 
22  Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263. See also Tizzano, loc. cit. n. 4, at 139. 
23  Case C-124/95 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v. HM Treasury and Bank of England 
[1997] ECR I-81, paras. 26 and 41. 
 
24  On the last dimension, see more extensively R.A. Wessel, ‘The Multi-Level Constitution of 
European Foreign Relations’, in D.M. Curtin, S. Griller, S. Prechal and B. de Witte, eds., The 
Emerging Constitution of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004, forthcoming). 
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prescribed by the legal bases coincide.25 An early example is the Joint Action 
concerning measures protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial applica-
tion of legislation adopted by a third country (the reaction of the Union to the 
Cuba and Iran and Libya Sanctions Acts of the United States). This Joint Action 
was the first one with a dual legal basis, which was located in both the second and 
the third pillar (former Articles J.3 and K.3(2)(b) EU are mentioned as the legal 
basis).26 In addition, it was explicitly connected to an EC Regulation in order to 
constitute an ‘integrated system’. The adoption of the Joint Action was to a large 
extent superfluous, in view of the scope of the EC Regulation, but the Council 
obviously intended to create a watertight system to protect the citizens of the 
Union in all possible issue areas. It was made clear, however, that the Joint 
Action was to be seen as supplementary to the EC Regulation, since both deci-
sions stipulated that Member States should take the measures they deemed 
necessary to protect the interests of any person referred to in the EC Regulation 
‘insofar as these interests are not protected under that Regulation’. A more recent 
case concerns the Council’s Common Positions on combating terrorism and on 
the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. These decisions clearly 
combine foreign policy issues with increased cooperation between the operational 
services responsible for combating terrorism: Europol, Eurojust, the intelligence 
services, police forces and judicial authorities.27 The decisions, as well as all 
subsequent ones related to them, are based on both Article 15 EU (CFSP) and 
Article 34 EU (PJCC). It is interesting to note that where specific measures are 
needed to implement these decisions, the Council once again pulls the matter 
back into one single pillar. Thus, specific measures for police and judicial 
cooperation to combat terrorism were based on Articles 30, 31 and 34(2)(c) EU 
only.28 
This example shows that a combination of legal bases chosen from the second 
and the third pillar may work because they involve similar decision-making 
procedures and instruments. At present, this forms the reason why the combina-
tion of a Community legal basis with legal bases in the other EU pillars is more 
difficult. Even if one succeeds in combining the decision-making procedures, 
there is the problem of finding a legal instrument that may be used across all 
pillars. An exceptional case concerns the establishment of the new committees in 
the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. The decisions to 
                                                                                                                                               
25  See R.H. van Ooik, De keuze der rechtsgrondslag voor besluiten van de Europese Unie 
(Deventer, Kluwer 1999) Chapter 9. 
26 Council Decision 96/668/CFSP of 22 November 1996. 
27  Council Common Positions 2001/930/CFSP and 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001, OJ 
2001 L 344, 28 December 2001. For a recent update, see Council Common Position 2003/651/CFSP 
of 12 September 2003, OJ 2003 L 229, 13 September 2003. 
28  See Council Decision 2003/48/JHA of 19 December 2002, OJ 2003 L 16, 22 January 2003. 
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establish the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the 
Military Staff were all based on Article 28(1) EU and Article 207(2) EC.29 In this 
case, the decision-making procedures coincided because Article 28 EU simply 
refers to Article 207 EC.30 
The solution is mostly found in a combination of two governance regimes, as 
in the case of the extra-territorial application of the above-mentioned legislation. 
The classic example, of course, is the case of economic sanctions, where CFSP 
and EC measures are presented as complementary. Despite the obvious differ-
ences in the separate decision-making procedures needed – the most striking 
being the need for a Commission proposal under Article 301 EC, the possibility 
for qualified majority voting under the same provision and the requirement of 
unanimity under Article 23(1) EU – this combination of legal bases is still the 
way in which the legal institutional dilemma is approached; apart from the 
possibility of using either a single CFSP legal basis (arms embargoes)31 or a 
single EC legal basis (many sanctions regimes based on UN resolutions). The 
same complexity occurs with regard to unilateral measures adopted by the Union 
in cases of the violation of international obligations by a third State (e.g. with-
drawal of benefits, suspension of development assistance and/or flight bans) or in 
cases of the suspension of treaty obligations (e.g. suspending a cooperation 
agreement because of a fundamental change in circumstance or invoking the 
human rights clauses in bilateral cooperation or trade agreements).32 Whereas the 
suspension of treaty obligations may only be based on the Community Treaty 
(Art. 300(2), second subparagraph), in the other situations one may come across 
single CFSP or EC decisions, or combinations thereof, on the basis of Article 301 
EC and Articles 14 or 15 EU. Until recently, a similar example could be found in 
the regime concerning the export of dual-use goods: the economic decision on the 
export ban was taken on the basis of Article 133 EC, whereas the actual list of 
goods falling under the regime, as well as their destinations, was established on 
                                                                                                                                               
29  See Council Decisions 2001/78/CFSP, 2001/79/CFSP and 2001/80/CFSP of 22 January 2001, 
OJ 2001 L 27, 30 January 2001. The same holds true for the subsequent decisions related to the 
setting up of these committees. 
30  Article 28 EU provides that a listed number of EC provisions shall apply to CFSP as well. 
Article 207(2) EC regulates the role of the General Secretariat of the Council. While the relevance 
for the establishment of the Military Staff (as a part of the General Secretariat) is obvious, the article 
does not seem to relate to the Military Committee or the Political and Security Committee. In that 
respect, the choice of this legal basis is somewhat surprising. 
31  The rationale for not using Article 301 EC in this situation is to be found in Article 296(1)(b) 
EC, which permits Member States to take the necessary measures for the protection of their essential 
security interests connected with the trade in arms. 
 
32  See more extensively E. Paasivirta and A. Rosas, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasures and Related 
Actions in the External Relations of the EU’, in Cannizzaro, op. cit. n. 4, at pp. 207-218. 
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the basis of Article 14 EU.33 In 2000, this situation largely came to an end with 
the introduction of a new Regulation bringing the CFSP parts of the regime 
within the Community’s field of competence.34 Nevertheless, the tension between 
common commercial policy (EC) and national security measures (CFSP) contin-
ues to exist, as the control of technical assistance related to certain military end-
uses continues to be based on the second pillar.35  
Over the years, this led to situations in which Community competences 
seemed to be eroded by CFSP measures, while at other times they were actually 
widened due to the foreign policy activity of the Union as a whole. Examples of 
CFSP decisions that have seriously thwarted Community policy in a particular 
area include the monitoring of the elections in Russia and South Africa and the 
KEDO initiative on nuclear energy in Korea.36 One could argue that the latter 
decision in particular clearly concerned a Community matter, but it was neverthe-
less pulled into the CFSP for political reasons. By using the formula of a Joint 
Action, the Member States themselves would be more in control and the Com-
mission’s influence on external policy would be contained.37 Other examples 
include the above-mentioned decisions on the export of dual-use commodities 
(the CFSP dimension of which could be questionable),38 the Joint Action on the 
Middle East peace process (which contained a number of Community issues) and 
the Common Positions on Rwanda and Ukraine (which were already explicitly 
criticised by the Commission in 1994 because of the inclusion of Community 
matters in the operational part of the decisions).39 In addition, the implementation 
of the Mostar operation showed that budgetary procedures were also able to 
create an impression of the ‘PESCalisation’ of Community principles.40 The 
implementation of this operation was in the hands of a special EU Administrator 
                                                                                                                                               
33  For an overview, see P. Koutrakos, ‘Inter-Pillar Approaches to the European Security and 
Defence Policy: The Economic Aspects of Security’, in V. Kronenberger, ed., The European Union 
and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (The Hague, TMC Asser Press 2001) pp. 
435-480. 
34  Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000, OJ 2000 L 159, 30 June 2000. 
35  See Council Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP of 22 June 2000, OJ 2000 L 159, 30 June 2000. 
36  G. Burghardt and G. Tebbe, ‘Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Eu-
ropäischen Union – Rechtliche Struktur und politischer Prozeß’, EuR (1995) pp. 1-20 at p. 15. H.G. 
Krenzler and H.C. Schneider, ‘Die Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitiek der Europäischen 
Union – Zur Frage der Kohärenz’, 29 Europarecht (1994) pp. 144-161, also point to the danger of 
Community procedures being affected by CFSP practice. Cf. also S. Keukeleire, Het buitenlands 
beleid van de Europese Unie (Deventer, Kluwer 1998) at pp. 332-337. 
37  Keukeleire, op. cit. n. 36, at p. 333. 
38  See C.W.A. Timmermans, ‘The Uneasy Relationship between the Communities and the 
Second Union Pillar: Back to the “Plan Fouchet”?’, 26 Legal Issues of European Integration (1997) 
pp 61-70 at p. 69. 
39  See Common Positions 94/697/CFSP and 94/779/CFSP, also referred to by Gauttier, loc. cit. 
n. 17, at p. 28. 
40  PESC is the French abbreviation for the CFSP.  
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who was responsible only to the Presidency and to a permanent advisory group of 
the Council. The Presidency was responsible for the financial management of the 
operation, which brought the whole system into conflict with the prerogatives of 
the Commission in this field.41 Finally, Common Strategies partly seem to direct 
Community action as well, irrespective of their CFSP basis. Thus, the 1999 
Common Strategy on Ukraine made decisions on the use of Community instru-
ments (para. 38) and even spoke on behalf of the Community in the area of the 
environment, energy and nuclear safety (para. 56).42 
Although maybe less frequently, Community competences in the area of ex-
ternal relations have also widened. With the development of the CFSP, the 
Community has also explored new terrains. A case in point is the Community’s 
contribution to UNMIK, the UN interim administration in Kosovo. On the basis 
of Regulation (EC) No 1080/2000, the Commission was, inter alia, in charge of 
the division of costs between the European Union and other members of the 
international community. There was no legal basis for Community action in this 
area, which left the Council with Article 308 EC (the legal basis of last resort 
when no explicit legal basis is available).43 More generally, the Community is 
often pulled into foreign policy actions that used to be outside its range of 
activities. Many human rights protection and democracy enhancement operations 
in third countries do not have an explicit relation to actions in which the Commu-
nity is competent to engage. However, many of these actions simply require the 
use of Community funds for actions that have their origin in a CFSP decision. 
All in all, this leaves us with a complex picture of the legal institutional di-
lemmas resulting from the wish to hold on to the different modes of governance 
chosen for the distinct policy areas of the Union and the need for coherent 
external action. These dilemmas have also occurred in an institutional sense 
within both the Commission and the Council. Thus, the attempt to create more 
coherence by reshuffling the portfolios of the Commissioners does not yet seem 
to have resulted in improved coordination between the pillars (in fact, this 
coordination seems to depend mainly on good working relations between the 
Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for the CSFP). 
The same holds true for the working methods of the Council, where the Political 
and Security Committee and Coreper both still have different input sources and 
decision-making tracks. Nevertheless, in some areas (e.g. economic sanctions and 
suspension of cooperation), the Union seems to have succeeded in assuring more 
coherence. Thus, for example, Community measures on the promotion (or 
                                                                                                                                               
41  Keukeleire, op. cit. n. 36, at p. 319. 
42  See Common Strategy 99/877/CFSP of 11 December 1999, OJ 1999 L 331, 23 December 
1999. On this issue, see more extensively R. Baratta, ‘Overlaps Between EC Competence and EU 
Foreign Policy Activity’, in Cannizzaro, op. cit. n. 4, at pp. 51-75. 
43  See Baratta, loc. cit. n. 42, at p. 56. 
 
FRAGMENTATION IN THE GOVERNANCE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 135 
suspension) of economic and social reconstruction are sometimes combined with 
CFSP measures on arms trade or travel restrictions for officials.44 In addition, the 
recent anti-terrorism measures show that an integrated approach is possible. 
Because of the fragmentation of the Union’s external relations, however, an 
integrated approach still does not come naturally. 
 
 
4. PJCC AND THE OTHER PILLARS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS IN THE JHA DOMAIN 
 
External relations in the area of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters are booming. An obvious reason is the fast development of the Justice 
and Home Affairs domain in general. Over the past few years, the Council has 
adopted almost ten texts per month on JHA issues.45 Since 2001, external 
relations in the JHA domain can be found in so-called ‘multi-presidency pro-
grammes’.46 As Article 38 EU provides for matters in Title IV EU (PJCC) to be 
covered by agreements concluded on the basis of Article 24 EU, there is now an 
explicit competence for the Union to engage in legal relations with third States 
and other international organisations in this field. So far, two agreements have 
been signed on this basis: the EU-US Agreement on Extradition and the EU-US 
Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance.47 Although the European Union as such 
has become a party to the agreements, it is interesting to note that the United 
States doubted the legal capacity of the Union to conclude agreements and 
demanded that the individual Member States drew up separate declarations on the 
applicability of the bilateral assistance and extradition agreements between them 
and the United States.48 Apart from these agreements concluded by the Union as 
such, Article 42(2) of the Europol Convention allows the agency to establish and 
                                                                                                                                               
44  See, for instance, the Common Positions on Liberia (2001/357/CFSP and 2002/457/CFSP) or 
the decisions relating to Zimbabwe (Common Position 2002/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EC) 
No 310/2002). See more extensively Gauttier, loc. cit. n. 17, at p. 32. 
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46  For a recent update, see Council of the European Union, Presidency: JHA External Relations 
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47  OJ 2003 L 181, 17 July 2003. 
 
48  Article 3(2) of the Agreement on Extradition and Article 3(2) and (3) of the Agreement on 
Mutual Legal Assistance. See S. Marquard, ‘La capacité de l’Union européenne de conclure des 
accords internationaux dans le domaine de la coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénal’, in 
G. De Kerchove and A. Weyembergh, eds., Sécurité et justice: enjeu de la politique extérieure de 
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maintain relations with third States and international organisations.49 The first 
agreement on this basis was signed between Europol and the United States on the 
exchange of both strategic and technical information in the fight against a broad 
range of serious forms of international crime and the exchange of liaison officers. 
A more comprehensive agreement was signed on 20 December 2002.50 These 
agreements, together with the two agreements concluded between the European 
Union and the United States on extradition and mutual legal assistance, revealed a 
serious shortcoming in the treaty-making procedure of Articles 24 and 38 EU, as 
this procedure does not include consultation of the European Parliament, irrespec-
tive of the potentially major implications for citizens’ rights and freedoms. 
It is clear that the fact that different procedures are used in the third pillar, as 
compared to the Community, adds to the fragmentation of the Union’s external 
relations, as Article 300 EC does call for consultation of the Parliament. But 
cross-pillar problems are not limited to parliamentary control. The competences 
of the Community on the basis of Title IV EC (asylum, immigration, border 
controls and judicial cooperation in civil matters) have a clear relationship with 
those in Title VI EU. The external competences of the European Community 
under Title IV have been confirmed by the conclusion of the readmission 
agreements concerning illegal immigration as well as for the readmission clauses 
in the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreements with Central American 
countries signed on 15 December 2003.51 These Community competences on the 
basis of Title IV EC occasionally overlap with EU competences in the third pillar. 
Obvious examples may be found in relation to the Schengen acquis. Agreements 
have been concluded or are under negotiation both with Switzerland and with 
Norway and Iceland regarding the free movement of persons, covering both 
Community and third pillar issues. Monar points to the fact that this has the effect 
that, in one and the same article of an international agreement, one aspect falls 
under Title IV EC and another under Title VI EU, which results in enormous 
coordination efforts between the Commission, the Presidency and the Member 
States.52 
                                                                                                                                               
49  See also Council Act of 8 November 1998 providing for an explicit treaty-making power of 
Europol, OJ 1999 C 26/19, 30 January 1999. See also H.G. Nilsson, ‘Organs and Bodies of the Third 
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and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
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In the previous section, I already pointed to the fact that, in particular after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the relationship between the second and 
the third pillar has grown closer as well. At present, third pillar anti-terrorism 
issues are part and parcel of ‘political dialogue’ meetings, which are generally 
though to take place on the basis of the CFSP and agreements with third States, 
combine policies on the basis of both (or even all three) pillars.53 
  
 
5. DOES THE NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION OFFER SOLUTIONS 
FOR THIS FRAGMENTATION? 
 
The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereinafter, ‘the Consti-
tution’) – which was finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in July 
2003 – will be signed in the autumn of 2004, albeit in a somewhat modified 
version. The question is whether the new provisions will solve the fragmentation 
of the external relations discussed in this paper. 
The most important structural change is that the Constitution puts an end to 
the pillar structure. We are left with one international organisation – the Union – 
with competences in the former Community areas as well as in the areas of the 
CFSP and PJCC. In the area of external relations, moreover, no division is made 
between economic and political (foreign affairs) issues. Title V of Part III of the 
Constitution is labelled ‘The Union’s External Action’ and covers all the Union’s 
external policies. In addition, the external objectives of the Union are no longer 
scattered over different treaties. Instead, Article I-3(4) provides: 
 
‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its val-
ues and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development 
of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children’s 
rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, includ-
ing respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ 
 
Other provisions also add to the idea of the integration of the different external 
policies. Thus, Article III-194 codifies the existing practice that the former 
‘Common Strategies’ (the term is no longer used) may cover all aspects of the 
Unions’ external action; they are no longer restricted to the CFSP. Secondly, 
consistency is being sought in the introduction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
who will not only chair the Foreign Affairs Council, but will also be Vice-President 
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of the Commission. Thirdly, the legal personalities of the Community and the 
European Union are merged into one legal personality of the new Union. This 
will certainly simplify matters in relation to the conclusion of treaties and 
questions of accountability and responsibility. Article III-227 applies to all 
agreements concluded by the Union and no distinction is made, either in proce-
dure or in legal nature, between the different external policies. Finally, the 
Constitution puts an end to the different types of instruments that can be used for 
the CFSP. Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common Positions make way 
for the ‘European decision’, an instrument that may also be used in other (former 
Community) issue areas. 
While these modifications can certainly be regarded as an acknowledgment of 
the unity of the Union’s legal order as it has developed over the years, a number 
of other provisions indicate that the drafters of the Constitution were not willing 
to go all the way where the integration of the pillars is concerned. While Commu-
nity and third pillar issues indeed seem to have been placed on an equal footing 
(e.g. international representation by the Commission and expansion of qualified 
majority voting), the CFSP continues to have a distinct nature under the new 
Treaty.54 A first element concerns the kind of competences in the CFSP area. 
Article I-11 lists the competences of the Union in the different areas as exclusive, 
shared or supporting and supplementary. However, none of these competences 
relates to the CFSP, as Article I-11 includes a separate paragraph referring to a 
‘competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, 
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy’. As Cremona has 
already indicated, it is a little difficult to see what kind of competence it could be, 
if not one of the other categories.55 But the simple fact that a special status has 
been introduced again is striking. 
Similar confusion results from the available instruments. Indeed, the CFSP is 
going to be developed on the basis of one type of instrument, the ‘European 
decision’, which is defined in Article I-32(1) as ‘a non-legislative act, binding in 
its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be 
binding only on them.’ Apart from the inherent complexity of this description, the 
implications are that the choice of this instrument allows for differentiation, as 
non-legislative acts are not subject to the legislative procedure laid down in the 
Treaty. The procedure for adopting European decisions in the area of the CFSP 
indeed still differs from other areas of external relations and comes close to the 
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current situation: a limited role for the Commission and the European Parliament 
and an important (even enhanced) role for the European Council and the Council 
of Ministers. The Court’s jurisdiction continues to be excluded. Despite the 
overall simplification of the instruments, the Treaty even seems to hold on to the 
former CFSP instruments, albeit disguised as European decisions. Thus, we can 
easily find Common Strategies (‘European decisions on the strategic interests and 
objectives of the Union’, Arts. I-39 and III-194), Common Positions (‘European 
decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a 
geographical or thematic nature’, Art. III-199) and Joint Actions (‘Where the 
international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council of 
Ministers shall adopt the necessary European decisions’, Art. III-198(1)). The 
chances are high that in practice the current fragmentation of instruments will 
continue to exist. 
This idea is strengthened by the fact that the CFSP still occupies a separate 
position in the new Constitution. Title V of Part I contains a separate Chapter II 
entitled ‘Specific Provisions’, in which the institutional provisions and procedures 
in the area of the CFSP and the Common Defence and Security Policy are laid 
down. In addition, Article III-209 underlines this separation by providing that the 
implementation of the CFSP shall not affect the other competences of the Union, 
and vice versa. Apart from the fact that with this provision the new Treaty 
purports to prevent not only the ‘PESCalisation’ of other policies (see section 3 
supra), but also the ‘communitarisation’ of the CFSP, this clearly echoes the 
current text of Article 47 EU. Finally, fragmentation returns in the external 
representation of the Union. Whereas the general task of the Commission is to 
‘ensure the Union’s external representation’ (Art. I-25), this role is excluded in 
CFSP policies, where the new Minister for Foreign Affairs will take the lead. One 
could argue that consistency is ensured with the ‘double-hatting’ construction (the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs is at the same time a member of the Commission). 
On the other hand, given the fact that the preparation of CFSP policies will continue 
to be distinct from other policies, there remains a potential for conflicting policies. 
Moreover, practice will have to reveal if the Foreign Minister will be able to avoid 
schizophrenia while serving the Commission and the Council at the same time.  
 
 
6.   CONCLUSION 
 
The current regulation of the European Union’s external relations reflects a 
compromise between the unity of the Union’s legal order and the wish to use 
separate decision-making procedures and instruments in the area of foreign and 
security policy and police and judicial cooperation. From an institutional perspec-
tive, the combination of the modes of governance prescribed in the different 
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pillars in pillar-overarching cases has resulted in a fragmented external policy. To 
the traditional problems of vertical consistency and delimitation (often resulting 
in ‘mixity’), the pillar structure has added the problem of horizontal consistency 
and delimitation. Practice shows that although competences are generally strictly 
divided, both vertically and horizontally, issues cannot always be handled within 
the safe boundaries of one pillar. Ironically, the legal institutional dilemmas 
caused by this situation seem to have resulted in a strengthening of the unity of 
the Union’s legal order as practice was forced to shoot holes in the dividing walls 
between the pillars agreed upon in Maastricht. 
The diversity and fragmentation is obstinate because of what economics refers 
to as ‘path dependencies’. Because of the different institutional history of the 
pillars, which during their development created separate regimes in these areas, it 
has become difficult to ignore the origins of the cooperation in the three issue 
areas. With regard to the CFSP, in particular, the new draft Constitution maintains 
a certain fragmentation, as procedures and instruments continue to be different. 
At the same time, the unity of the Union’s legal order will become more explicit 
after the dilution of the pillar structure, which may have a converging effect on 
the variations that still exist. 
Finally, when the general EU procedures and instruments become the default 
choice where decision making with regard to external relations is concerned, the 
point of gravity within the CFSP may come to rest more on the most sensitive 
issues (security and defence) and less on foreign relations. This may result in a 
‘residual character’ of the CFSP, because of the inclusion of more and more 
foreign policy issues in the general external policy of the European Union.56 At 
the same time, economic sanctions, dual-use problems and the extra-territorial 
application of US legislation show that the non-Community pillars have served as 
an escape when sensitive issues present themselves. The new Constitution 
continues to offer possibilities in this respect. 
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